Limits, fallbacks, and safety boundaries

The old roadmap called major platform capabilities “non-goals.” The v0.0.2 truth reset removes that escape hatch. Missing, partial, blocked, and research-only work is now owned by one of 15 implementation phases.

Limitations that are being implemented

Capability	Current truth	Owning phase
Trusted Homebrew/archive/`.pkg` install	Does not exist; source development only.	02 and 15
Apple `container` + Containerization parity	Apple provider is narrow; direct helper absent.	03
Complete Manifest/lifecycle/rollback	Restricted v2 subset and narrow apply only.	04
OCI/registry/Keychain/supply chain	Local reference and policy fragments only.	05
Persistent storage/data protection	Scaffolding and guarded mounts only.	06
Networks/DNS/ingress/TLS/tunnels	Metadata/research; no complete implementation.	07
Autonomous daemon/observability/GC	Foreground loop and local events/diagnostics only.	08
API/auth/RBAC/admission/audit/plugins	One-shot API and reviewed-local handshake only.	09
Scheduler/optimization/accelerators	Advisory models/research only.	10
Multi-Mac consensus/HA	Research only.	11
Kubernetes/CRI/CNI/CSI/Helm	Not implemented.	12
Docker/Compose/Podman/Testcontainers/IDE	Narrow import only; no Docker API.	13
GUI/team/MDM/optional cloud	Requirements/local profiles only.	14
Security/fuzz/soak/conformance/signed GA	Not qualified.	15

Fallbacks for external constraints

Homebrew-core acceptance is external. Hostwright guarantees a vendor tap once Phase 02 passes; the unqualified formula is submitted in Phase 15.
Direct guest GPU/ANE passthrough waits for a supported public Apple API. Phase 10 implements a signed authenticated host-native Metal/Core ML/MLX service instead of fabricating passthrough.
Multi-Mac mutation becomes read-only without etcd quorum rather than acknowledging unsafe conflicting writes.
Third-party tunnels are optional providers; Hostwright-to-Hostwright secure tunnels remain a first-party Phase 07 outcome.

Permanent boundaries

Only the unsafe mechanism is excluded:

private or undocumented Apple APIs;
Intel or old-macOS emulation outside the Apple-silicon platform;
cluster mutation without quorum;
silent telemetry or automatic diagnostics upload;
unauthenticated public control;
deletion of resources Hostwright cannot prove it owns.

Conservative cleanup stays permanent

A tool that deletes the wrong resource once loses trust. Names and similarity never prove ownership. Hostwright can discover or quarantine an unmanaged resource, but adoption and deletion require explicit identity and authorization. See the safety model.